

USA

No. 4 April 1972

Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100007-8

## THE REORGANIZATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE

[Article by Yu. A. Shvedkov and B. G. Rodanov; Moscow, USA: Economics, Politics, Ideology, Russian, No 4, April 1972, pp 51-55]

Behind the scenes of the Washington government departments, disputes on the reorganization of the ramified system of U.S. intelligence organs and particularly of the system of their leadership, have been proceeding for almost a whole year. As far back as May 1971, according to The New York Times, a plan for such reorganization was prepared by assistants of the National Security Council and the Administrative and Budget Office and placed on the President's table.[1] However, the taking of a decision on the plan was severely delayed and only on 5 November was a White House statement on the reconstruction of the management of the intelligence services made public. This makes one suppose that the Administration's attempts to introduce changes to the work of the cumbersome U.S. intelligence service, unaccustomed to control, ran into certain difficulties.

The U.S. intelligence service has always laid claim to extensive rights and "global" powers. The working doctrine of the U.S. intelligence service, formulated by one of its founders, Allen Dulles, sets as its aim penetration into the affairs of various states of the world and into those spheres where the hand of the diplomatic service or any other departments does not reach. "Today," Dulles wrote in the book The Craft of Intelligence, which has acquired the nature of a political behest, "the intelligence service must stand permanent watch over all parts of the world, irrespective of what the minds of diplomats and soldiers are engaged in at a given moment, our vital interests could be struck at any moment in almost any part of the world." [2] Expenditures on technical and agent espionage and on the holding of secret subversive operations and "paramilitary" actions in various countries have steadily increased. According to by no means complete data from the U.S. press, they recently reached 5-6 billion dollars a year.[3] The numbers of U.S. intelligence service employees, not counting the broad body of agents within the United States and abroad, has exceeded 200,000 people.[4] About ten federal departments and agencies have acquired their own intelligence subdivisions and several other agencies have turned out to be engaged in intelligence operations kept secret from the public. According to informed U.S. researchers, the State Department and the U.S. Information Agency in particular take part in such operations. The latter, for instance, has its own secret subdivision engaged in sending air balloons with leaflets of subversive content into the socialist countries.[5]

The broad scope of their intelligence and subversive activity has in no way preserved the U.S. Intelligence Service organs and primarily the main organs -- the CIA and the Defense Intelligence Agency -- from errors in information and political failures. According to opinion now being expressed in the U.S. press, the Defense Intelligence Agency has been particularly unlucky. It failed

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central headquarters" in the jungles of Cambodia, the unsuccessful attempt to "kill" Laos -- all these discomfitures connected with errors in information and complicated by the wave of dissatisfaction in the United States with the espionage carried out by military men in their own country have seriously compromised this agency in Washington.

In a situation aggravated by the forced reexamination by U.S. ruling circles of the possibilities and obligations of this country in the world arena, reexamination has also been extended to the activity of the U.S. Intelligence Service. "If the United States has finally decided to pause in the expansion of its foreign interests and in its interference in the affairs of foreign states," the U.S. diplomat John Campbell writes in his recently published book The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory, "then the time has also undoubtedly come for a more restricted concept of political intelligence." [6] In September 1971 Victor Marchetti, former CIA leading assistant, sent to Congress and made public a memorandum which accused the main U.S. Intelligence Department of senseless and dangerous "expenditure of efforts." The wide publicity given this document confirmed the increased dissatisfaction of various circles of the U.S. public with the activity of the Washington intelligence organs.

A deciding factor for the reorganization of the Intelligence Services turned out to be the fact that even leading figures in the White House had begun to display dissatisfaction with the incommensurability of the information coming from the Intelligence Service with the enormous funds spent on it. In the course of reorganization, emphasis was laid on subordinating the activity of the leading intelligence organs to the needs and requirements of the White House to a greater degree, by means of their reorganization and on simultaneously reducing their expenditures to some extent.

It is true that in the past the Intelligence Service leadership was responsible to the President. In accordance with the 1947 National Security Law, the post of Director of the Central Intelligence Service (he is director of the CIA) who was assigned the tasks of coordinating the whole activity of the U.S. Intelligence Services, was instituted under the National Security Council. At the beginning of 1962 President Kennedy sent the leaders of the appropriate agencies a special letter which stressed that the Central Intelligence Service director was the President's personal representative and the main official responsible for the coordination of all the activity of all organizations and agencies carrying out intelligence work. [7] The CIA director was also put at the head of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, whose formal duties are to determine the directions of "intelligence efforts," coordinate the distribution of the corresponding appropriations, and bear responsibility for the quality of the intelligence information received from all services. However, even this quite centralized system was unable to prevent rivalry between the individual intelligence agencies and the duplication of their actions.

As a result of the present reorganization, the structure of the leading U.S. intelligence organs has been complicated still further. A new intelligence committee headed by the President's Assistant for Questions of National Security has been created under the National Security Council. The members of the committee are the Attorney General, the CIA Director, Deputy Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. According to an official White House statement, "the committee will give instructions and effect leadership in the field of determining national intelligence requirements and assess the information collected by the Intelligence Service from the viewpoint of the intelligence information consumers." [8] Thus, ~~Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP84-00499R001000100007-8~~ This complex of other previously created National Security Council groups and committees, appear to be basically information functions.

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scandalous failures of the U.S. intelligence services' subversive activity in the fifties, a special organ handling the approval of major operations of a secret political nature has been operating under the U.S. President and under the leadership of his assistant on questions of national security. This organ has had various names -- after the numbers and dates of the directives when confirmed its functions -- and was recently named the "Forty Committee" after the number of the President's latest memorandum. The staff of the "Forty Committee" coincided completely with the staff of the intelligence committee created under the National Security Council.

The U.S. press suggests that the former committee be merged with the new one. "It is believed in intelligence circles that the "Forty Committee" will obviously be included in a new subcommittee of the Council inasmuch as the staff of the two is the same," The New York Times wrote.[9] However, it is more natural to suppose that it is rather a matter not of a simple merger but of the combination of two different functions in the hands of this National Security Council organ -- the first function -- suitable for publication -- being its information function and the other, unpublicized function, being the approval of secret operations.

Under the Intelligence Committee a special group is also being created made up of assistants from the National Security Council apparatus headed by Andrew Marshall, former RAND Corporation consultant. This group, which has received no official name and which the U.S. press calls the "concluding assessment group" or the "group for assessing consequences" will, according to a White House statement, "bear responsibility for the examination and assessment of all information obtained by the intelligence service and for its analysis."

It is known from a book published in 1970 by Harry Ransom, a well-known U.S. specialist on intelligence-information work, that alongside the practice of preparing generalized documents on the situation in a particular part of the world (the so-called "national intelligence assessments") which has taken shape over many years in the work of the U.S. Intelligence Services, under the new administration, basically with the efforts of assistants from the National Security Council apparatus and with the enlistment of intelligence specialists, new documents have begun to be prepared which contain comparisons of the resources and potentials of the United States and other states mainly, of course, in the military field (the so-called "concluding assessments")[10] It is obvious from the opinions of the U.S. press that from now on the preparation of these particularly responsible documents will be the task of the newly created groups.

Ransom's book also tells us that the Intelligence Service has recently begun to prepare documents on the possible consequences of any particular course in U.S. policy (the so-called "direct assessments") as aid to those making important foreign policy decisions. The duty of prompting the courses in question lies beyond the competence of the Intelligence Service -- on higher and particularly trusted assistants of the foreign policy apparatus. There are grounds for supposing that this duty will also be assigned the newly created group. As The Washington Sunday Star wrote, this group will tell Helms (CIA director -- author) what exactly must be determined and what results could be produced abroad by any particular policy discussed in the White House." [11]

A consultative committee on questions of the sources of intelligence information is being created outside the National Security Council system and is headed by the director of the CIA. Its members will be leading representatives of the Department of State and the Defense Department.

According to an official announcement this committee "will give advice to the CIA director on questions of the preparation of a joint program budget for the Intelligence Service." The nature of this assignment suggests two interesting conclusions.

First, the CIA director is receiving for the first time full powers to keep an eye on the most secret aspect of the activity of the various intelligence agencies -- their budget. Second, from now on it is proposed to prepare a "joint program budget" for the Intelligence Service, that is, a budget with precisely defined special trends and preliminary rough drafts going beyond the framework of a single year.

In accordance with the new White House decisions it is planned to "consolidate the leading role of the CIA director in the field of planning, in reviewing the coordination and assessment of all intelligence programs, and in the activity of the Intelligence Service, and also in the field of the information collected by the National Intelligence Service." He is, as it were, being raised above daily affairs and operations on which the deputy CIA director will be engaged more from now on. As for the Military Intelligence Service and its main organ, the Defense Intelligence Agency, it loses its former independence and privileged position. A new post is being created to control it -- the post of Assistant Defense Secretary for Intelligence to which Albert Hall, former leader of one of the aeronautics monopolies, has been appointed.[12]

The creation of new leading intelligence organs directly under the White House means that many very important functions are being removed from the sphere of activity of the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference. This organ, made up of the leaders of various intelligence departments, is being preserved, but such comparatively secondary tasks as "the observation of the distribution of intelligence material, its safekeeping and the protection of the sources of intelligence information and the methods of its acquisition" are moving to the foreground in its work.

It is still not clear at the moment how far the reorganization begun in the Intelligence Services will affect its working levels. It is obvious, however, that the process of reconstruction will extend from top to bottom. A White House announcement has already reported the creation of several new working organs -- the National Cipher Agency, the Unified Security Agency in the Defense Department, and the Military Cartography Agency.

As a whole the reorganization of the "intelligence community" which has been carried out testifies to the continuing process of the centralization of decision-making on main foreign policy and military problems in the hands of the U.S. President and his White House assistants.

#### FOOTNOTES

1. The New York Times, 11 May 1971.
2. A. Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence, New York, 1963, p 50.
3. The New York Times, 7 November 1971.
4. The Washington Sunday Star, 7 November 1971.
5. J. F. Campbell, The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory, New York, 1971, p 166.

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6. J. F. Campbell, Ibid, p 159.
7. L. B. Kirkpatrick Jr., The Real CIA, New York, 1968, pp 237-238.
8. Weekly Compilations of Presidential Documents, 8 November 1971.
9. The New York Times, 7 November 1971.
10. H. Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment, Cambridge, 1970, pp 150-155.
11. The Washington Sunday Star, 7 November 1971.
12. The New York Times, 5 November 1971.

CSO: 1803-F